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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES:
AN ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Most states, although denying public employees the right to strike, do
permit them to organize and to bargain collectively. Few states, however, have
enacted statutes providing collective bargaining machinery, or have other-
wise attempted to provide a meaningful substitute for the right to strike?
It is the intent of this comment to analyze those state statutes, 2 as well as
Federal Executive Order No. 10988,3 which make collective bargaining pro-
cedures available, and to determine whether they have materially enhanced
the collective bargaining process and/or minimized the likelihood for seri-
ous disputes which threaten to result in a strike.
Seven states have statutes which establish procedures for resolving
disputes between the public employer and its employees? These statutes
extend to most or all public employees 5 and feature procedures which have
a history of successful use in private industry, e.g., mediation and advisory
arbitration.° An analysis of these statutes will reveal their relative merits,
and demonstrate why the approach of some of them may be considered sig-
nificant attempts to provide meaningful collective bargaining.
1 The absence of statutory procedures does not mean that collective bargaining may
not exist. For instance, a study of Connecticut municipalities in 1960, before the enact-
ment of Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-467 to -477 (Supp. 1965), revealed that 31 out of
169 municipalities dealt directly with unions, and that there was a wide range of written
collective bargaining agreements between municipalities and unions. Stutz, Collective
Bargaining by City Employees, 15 Lab. L.J. 696 (1964).
2 This comment is by no means an exhaustive study of state statutes which provide
collective bargaining procedures, but analyzes only those statutes which cover a broad
range of public employees.
2 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Exec. Order No. 10988i.
4 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-467 to -477 (Supp. 1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
149, §§ 178G-N (Supp. 1965); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.454(27) (1960), as amended,
§§ 17.455(8)-(16) (Supp. 1965); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 179.50-.58 (1966); N.D. Cent. Code
§§ 34-11-01 to -05 (1960); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 215.1 (1964); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 111.70 (Supp. 1966).
6 The public employees affected are as follows: Connecticut—municipal employees
except teachers (separate statute) ; Massachusetts and Michigan—municipal employees;
Minnesota—all public employees except teachers; North Dakota and Pennsylvania—
all public employees; Wisconsin—municipal employees (Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 111.80-.94,
effective Jan. 1, 1967, provides similar collective bargaining procedures for state em-
ployees).
6 The term "advisory arbitration" is used to denote referral of an issue or issues
in dispute to aCthird party for a recommended settlement which is not binding on the
parties to the dispute. In practice, the device of fact-finding with recommendations, as
provided by the seven statutes examined, has many of the qualities of mediation as well
as those of an arbitration award.
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I. STATE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin
The Connecticut,? Massachusetts,° and Wisconsin° statutes are similar.
They provide, as a basis for collective bargaining, that an organization com-
prised of a majority of employees is entitled to be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent for all the employees in a bargaining unit." The power
to certify lies in a state labor board," which has jurisdiction to determine
whether the employees of the bargaining unit alleged to be appropriate by
a petitioning organization have a community of interest sufficient to allow
creation of an exclusive bargaining agency, and whether the petitioning or-
ganization has a majority of the employees in its membership. 12
To insure the right to organize and bargain collectively without inter-
ference, certain unfair labor practices are prohibited. 13 Accordingly, the labor
board may investigate a complaint, hold hearings, issue cease and desist
orders, and, in the case of a union violation, withdraw its certification.I 4
These provisions are nearly identical to the ones existing in private industry.°
All three states, upon request of both parties, make available the facili-
ties of a state mediation board." In Connecticut and Massachusetts, the ar-
bitration facilities of this same agency are available to parties for the settle-
ment of grievances arising out of an existing contract, but their availability
does not exclude the use of any other remedy. 17
Fact-finding with recommendations is the principal feature of the stat-
utes' procedures in the event of an impasse in negotiations over the terms
7 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-467 to -477 (Supp. 1965).
8
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, §§ 178G-N (Supp. 1965).
9 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70 (Supp. 1966).
19
 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-471(1)(B) (Supp. 1965) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
149, § 178H (Supp. 1965); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70(4)(d) (Supp. 1966).
11
 Connecticut—State Board of Labor Relations; Massachusetts—State Labor Re-
lations Commission; ‘Visconsin—Wisconsin Employment Relations Board.
12 The Wisconsin statute stipulates that a bargaining unit made up of the employees
of a particular government department should exclude those employees who are members
of craft unions. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70(4)(d) (Supp. 1966). The Connecticut and
Massachusetts statutes similarly distinguish professional employees from nonprofessional.
They also provide that firemen and policemen should comprise separate units. Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-471(3) (Supp. 1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, § 178H(4)
(Supp. 1965).
13
 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-470 (Supp. 1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149,
§ 178L (Supp. 1965) ; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70(3) (Supp. 1966).
14 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-471(4) (Supp. 1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149,
§ 178L (Supp. 1965); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 11.07, 111.70(4) (a) (Supp. 1966) (no express
provision 'for withdrawal of certification).
19
 Cf. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 101, 61 Stat. 140,
146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 160 (1964).
16 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-472(a) (Supp. 1965) (State Board of Mediation and
Arbitration); Mass, Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, § 178K (Supp. 1965) (State Board of
Conciliation and Arbitration) ; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70(4) (b) (Supp. 1966) (Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board).
17
 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-472(a) (Supp. 1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149,
§ 178K (Supp. 1965).
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of a new agreement. In Connecticutm and Massachusetts,' 0 either party to
a dispute may petition the state board for a fact-finding, (1) if the parties
have not reached an agreement after a reasonable period of negotiation, or
(2) within a reasonable period of time prior to the final date for establish-
ment of the municipal budget, or (3) when either party has failed to bargain
in good faith.25 Upon receiving a petition, the state board investigates its
allegations and decides whether a fact-finding is warranted. 21 If it is, the
board submits to both parties a list of persons from which they are to select
the fact-finder. If they cannot agree, then the board appoints him. Wisconsin
will furnish a panel of three impartial persons if both parties jointly request
it.22 In preparing his findings and recommendations under these acts, the
fact-finder may hold hearings, issue subpoenas, administer oaths, and take
testimony. 28 He may also, at his own discretion, endeavor to mediate the
dispute while acting in his capacity as fact-finder. 24 The government em-
ployer and the employee union are obliged to share equally the costs of the
fact-finding. 25
In Massachusetts, any agreement, whether or not achieved with the aid
of fact-finding with recommendations, must be put in the form of a written
contract. If legislative action is necessary to implement its terms, a request
for such is submitted to the legislative body. Should any term of the contract
conflict with any law, by-law, or ordinance, the latter is to prevail. 25 In Con-
necticut, the chief executive officer of the municipality signs any agreement
reached as a ministerial act, and the budget authority, where an appropriation
18 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-471(4)(B), -473(a) (Supp. 1965).
19 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, §§ 178J(a), L (Supp. 1965) (a "reasonable period
of time" is stipulated to be 60 days).
20 Wisconsin applies only the first and third criteria. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70(4)(e)
(Supp. 1966).
21 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-473(b) (Supp. 1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149,
§ 178J(b) (Supp. 1965); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70(4)(f) (Supp. 1966).
22 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70(4) (f) (Supp. 1966), as amended by Wis. Laws 1963,
c. 87. The reason given for the amendment is that "some complicated fact finding cases
might arise that could not be handled reasonably by a single fact finder." 3 Wisconsin
Legislative Council General Report 42 (1963).
23 Conn. Gen. Stat., Ann. § 7-473(c) (Supp. 1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149,
§ 178J(c) (Supp. 1965); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70(a) (Supp. 1966).
21 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-473(f) (Supp. 1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149,
§ 178J(f) (Supp. 1965). There is no specific provision in the Wisconsin statute allowing
a fact-finder to endeavor to mediate a dispute, but this has often been the case in prac-
tice. Letter from Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, Oct. 7, 1966.
25 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-473(e) (Supp. 1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149,
§ 178J(e) (Supp. 1965); Wis, Stat. Ann. § 111.70(4)(h)2 (Supp. 1966). In Connecticut
and Massachusetts, however, if a fact-finding results from a petition alleging refusal by
a party to bargain collectively, the party at fault must pay full costs. Conn. Gen. Stat,
Ann. § 7-471(4)(B) (Supp. 1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, § 178L (Supp. 1965).
Statistics of actual costs based on the experience in Wisconsin show that the average
cost for a fact-finding is approximately $500, but costs may go as high as $15,000
in an extremely complex case. Stern, The Wisconsin Public Employee Fact-Finding Pro-
cedure, 20 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 3, 7-8 (1966).
213 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, § 1781 (Supp. 1965). Contra, Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 7-474(f) (Supp. 1965).
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is needed, is required to comply with the contract terms." If legislative
action is necessary, a request for such must be submitted. The terms of a
contract prevail over any existing municipal ordinances or rules. 28 In Wis-
consin, the employer must put a written agreement in the form of an ordi-
nance or resolution, but it is binding on the parties "only if express languge
to that effect is contained therein."2°
In conjunction with these specific provisions, the statutes of Connecticut
and Massachusetts expressly impose upon an employer and an employee
organization the obligation to bargain in good faith and to "meet at rea-
sonable times, including meetings appropriately related to the budget-making
process."8° The Wisconsin statute requires, by implication, good-faith bar-
gaining.3 '
B. Minnesota
Of the four other states analyzed, Minnesota's statute, as amended in
1965,82 most closely resembles the provisions of the ones outlined above. Any
employee group regardless of size may be granted "informal recognition,"
a status which entitles that group to meet and confer with an employer.
"Formal recognition" is given to an organization having in its membership
a majority of the employees within an appropriate bargaining unit. 88 The au-
thority to certify employee representation, to hold elections, and to resolve
disputes over the appropriateness of a bargaining unit is vested in the state
labor conciliator, or a person designated by him."
Prior to 1965, the Minnesota statute empowered the state labor con-
ciliator to "certify . . . the name or names of the representatives that have
been designated or selected by the employees"" and to hold elections if
necessary. In that year, the statute was amended in order to clarify and ex-
pand this and other existing provisions. The changes were prompted by
Richfield Fed'n of Teachers v. Richfield Educ. Ass'n, 36 where the existing
27 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-474(b), (c), (f) (Supp. 1965).
28 See note 26 supra. The conflict between this provision and the corresponding one
in Massachusetts has little significance, since, in Connecticut, legislative action must be
taken to approve or reject any contract term which conflicts with an existing law. Thus,
in Connecticut, such a conflicting contract term prevails only until the legislature re-
solves the conflict.
29 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70(4)(i) (Supp. 1966). While this provision does allow
an employer to enter into a bilateral contract, it does not compel him to. Furthermore,
there is no provision placing the responsibility for negotiations on the highest executive
official. Thus, the Wisconsin statute does not guarantee, as the Connecticut and Massa-
chusetts acts do, that negotiations will not be a mere prelude to a final unilateral decision
of a government official, rather than a vehicle for arriving at a bilateral contract.
30 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-470(c) (Supp. 1965). See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
149, § 1781 (Supp. 1965) (slightly different wording).
31 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70(4)(e) (Supp. 1966) provides that fact-finding may be
initiated "where an employer or union fails or refuses to meet and negotiate in good
faith at reasonable times in a bona fide effort to arrive at a settlement."
32 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179.50-.58 (1966), as amended by Minn, Laws 1965, c. 839.
83 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 17932 subd. 3 (1966). Compare Exec. Order No. 10988, §§ 4-6.
34 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 17932 subd. 4 (1966).
a6 Minn. Laws 1957, c. 789, § 1.
38 263 Minn. 21, 115 1V.W.2d 682 (1962).
276
CURRENT LEGISLATION
statute was criticized for its failure to provide a method for determining
employee unit appropriateness and unit representation. 3I
Sections 179.521 and 179.57 of the Minnesota statute provide two dif-
ferent procedures in the case of negotiation disputes. 38 Under section 179.521,
either party may request the state labor conciliator to act if (1) no settlement
has been reached after a reasonable period of negotiating, or (2) either party
has failed or refused to meet and bargain in good faith. The conciliator "shall
then take whatever steps he deems expedient to bring about a settlement,
including assisting in preparing information necessary to an understanding
of the issues and of a settlement."
Section 179.57 applies to a controversy over "wages, hours, or other terms
and conditions of employment." 39 The employer, either on its own initiative
or at the request of a formally-recognized employee organization, sets up a
three-member panel. Each party appoints a delegate to the panel, and the
third member is chosen by these appointees. If they cannot agree to a third
person, the court appoints him. The expenses of the third member are shared
equally by the two parties. If further negotiations fail to bring about an
agreement, the three-member panel may hold hearings and submit a finding
of facts with recommendations. The establishment of this three-member
panel divests the state labor conciliator of the duties conferred upon him
by section 179.521. That section provides for mediation and fact-finding
without recommendations and is intended to precede the fact-finding with
recommendations provided under section 179.57. It is too early to perceive
whether these provisions are compatible, or whether section 179.521 is a
significant addition.
The 1965 changes in terminology in section 179.57, 4° however, were
definitely significant. The words "adjustment of grievances"41 were replaced
by "settlement of a controversy involving wages, hours, or other terms and
conditions of employment." 42 The confusion created by the word "grievances"
had necessitated a series of attorney-general opinions to interpret the types
of disputes intended to be covered by this section.'" In connection with this
alteration, section 179.571 was also added in 1965 ; 44 it guarantees employees
the right to an independent review of grievances pertaining to disputes over
37 Id. at 26, 115 N.W.2d at 686. The case concerned the petitions of two unions to
the state labor conciliator for certification as representatives of certain teachers before
the school board. One union suggested that the bargaining unit should be comprised of
teachers in grades seven through twelve. The other union argued that the unit should
be comprised of teachers in grades one through twelve and kindergarden. The court held
that in the absence of statutory authority, the labor conciliator had no jurisdiction to
determine what the bargaining unit should be.
38 Section 179.521 was enacted in 1965, whereas the somewhat similar provisions
of section 179.57 have been in effect since 1951, except for changes in terminology in 1965.
39 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179.57 subd. 1 (1966).
49 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179.57 (1966), as amended by Minn. Laws 1965, c. 839, § 5.
41 Minn. Laws 1951, c. 146, § 7.
42 Minn. Laws 1965, c. 839, §
43 E.g., Op: Att'y Gen. No. 270-1) (Minn. 1959) (discharge of an employee may be
the basis for a "grievance") ; Op. Att'y Gen. No. 165, at 304 (Minn. 1952) (inadequacy of
compensation is a "grievance").
44 Minn, Stat. Ann. § 179.571 (1966), as added by Minn. Laws 1965, c. 839, § 6.
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existing employment terms and conditions. Thus, the distinction between
disputes arising out of existing agreements and those arising out of negotia-
tions for a new agreement is clearly delineated by these 1965 amendments.
Another 1965 amendment to the Minnesota statute specifies that any
agreement reached by an employer and its employees shall be presented to the
governing body or officer having authority to put it into effect." The gov-
erning body or officer may take such action as it considers appropriate, includ-
ing submission of the agreement to a legislative body if necessary. This section
is an unfortunate addition because it distinguishes between the government
employer and the chief executive officer of that government unit." The
officer is free to accept or reject any agreement and, therefore, to nullify
the product of negotiations. Where such a prerogative exists in a high exec-
utive official, unilateral decision as opposed to bilateral bargaining is the
rule.47
Despite the 1965 amendments, which evidence recognition of some of
the problems plaguing public employer-employee relations, the Minnesota
statute still has certain weaknesses. For example, the use of a three-member
panel where two members are partisan is not as effective in resolving dis-
putes as a totally impartial fact-finder. The greatest weakness of the statute
is that the chief executive officer is not directly obligated to negotiate with
the employees. Thus, he is in a position to reject a settlement agreed to by a
subordinate management official. Where this situation is permitted to exist,
the collective bargaining machinery may be of little consequence to the em-
ployees.
C. Michigan
The Michigan provisions, 48
 part of the Hutchinson Act, were also ex-
tensively amended in 1965." Before these amendments, the statute contained
only the provision for mediation and fact-finding. 5° According to this pro-
vision, the State Labor Mediation Board is obligated to mediate a dispute
upon request of a majority of employees or the employer. The same agency
may also make findings of fact, but only if the employer has, prior to the
request for mediation and fact-finding, consented to the special procedures
by a resolution of its governing body. 54 Under the procedures, each party
chooses a representative, and the two chosen discuss the issues of the dispute.
If they are unable to reach an agreement within twenty days, they select a
third person; should they fail to agree on a third person, the chairman of
40 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179.522 (1966), as added by Minn. Laws 1965, c. 839, § 4.
48 But see Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-474(e) (Supp. 1965).
47 The injurious effects of such a situation are demonstrated by City of Minot v.
General Drivers Union No. 74, 142 N.W.2d 612 (ND. 1966), discussed fully pp. 280-81
infra.
Compare Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179.522 (1966) with Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-474(a)
(Supp. 1965) and Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, § 1781 (Supp. 1965). The latter two
statutes provide that the chief executive officer of the government unit has the
responsibility for the negotiations with an employee organization.
48 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.454(27) (1960), as amended, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 17.455(8)-
(16) (Supp. 1965).
40 Mich. Pub. Acts 1965, No. 379.




the labor board appoints him. 52 The three-member panel then submits written
findings and recommendations which are not binding on either party. The
disputing parties must pay the costs of the impartial member of the panel.
The statute does not explicitly describe the types of disputes subject
to the mediation and fact-finding procedures. The use of the word "griev-
ances" to describe the disputes has been a source of conflict in inter-
preting the statute. In Labor Mediation Bd. v. Jackson County Road
Comm'rs," the government employer argued that mediation and fact-finding
were available only in disputes over wages, hours, and terms of the condi-
tions of employment." The Michigan Supreme Court, overruling a lower
court's concurrence with this argument, held that the term "grievances"
was unambiguous and was not open to the definition urged by the govern-
ment employer. Instead, "grievance" must be read in the statute in its gen-
erally accepted sense.55
The 1965 amendments include procedures for the designation of an
employee organization as exclusive representative of employees within an
appropriate bargaining unit." In addition, certain unfair labor practices are
prohibited." Finally, the employer is obligated to meet and bargain in good
faith with the employee organization. 58 These provisions are similar to those
in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin." Another amendment gives
an employer the authority to enter into collective bargaining contracts with
an exclusively-recognized employee union." This clause. unequivocally vali-
dates bilateral agreements and does away with the necessity for adoption by
a governing body. The validity of such agreements, however, does not mean
that fiscal implementation by a legislative or budget-making body is elimi-
nated. It does mean that a collective bargaining agreement will not be negated
by the failure of a governing body to ratify it by passage of an ordinance or
resolution to that effect."
The impact of the 1965 • amendments is to transform an essentially
negative approach—only a dispute - resolving procedure—into a positive ap-
proach—the formulation of a collective bargaining system. The statute still
fails to distinguish between disputes emanating from existing contract terms
and those developed in the course of negotiations over the terms of a new
contract. The three-member panel is not the most effective form of fact-
finding with recommendations in the negotiation impasse situation, although
52 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.454(27)(c) (1960).
n 365 Mich. 645, 114 N.W.2d 183 (1962).
54 Id. at 650-51, 114 N.W.2d at 186. Cf. Garden City School Dist. v. Labor
Mediation Bd., 358 Mich. 258, 99 N.W.2d 485 (1959).
55 365 Mich. at 654-55, 114 N.W.2d at 187-88. The alleged "grievance" was employee
dissatisfaction with a "work policy" adopted by the employer and with his subsequent
failure to adopt the employees' submitted work policy.
56 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.455(11) (Supp. 1965).
57 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.455(16) (Supp. 1965).
59 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.455(15) (Supp. 1965).
69 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-468, -470, (c) (Supp. 1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 149, §§ 17814, I, L (Supp. 1965); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 111.70(3), (4)(d) (Supp. 1966).
60 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.455(15) (Supp. 1965).
61 Contra, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179.522 (1966).
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it may very well be suitable to resolving grievances arising out of the existing
terms of employment.62 The failure to distinguish the two types of disputes
undoubtedly accounts for the unfortunate retention of the mediation and
fact-finding procedures without any change.
D. North Dakota
The North Dakota statute" merely provides for written recommenda-
tions by a three-member panel in the event of a "grievance or matter in dis-
pute."64 A panel is established upon the request of the employer or a majority
of the employees. Upon such request, the chief executive officer of that gov-
ernment unit appoints a representative for each party. These two appointees
then choose a third." The government unit involved must pay all the ex-
penses of the panel. The panel determines the issues and makes its recom-
mendations, which are studied by both parties but are not binding."
The recent case of City of Minot v. General Drivers Union No. 74 67
reveals some of the shortcomings of the North Dakota statute. Representa-
tives of both parties met several times in March, April, and May of 1965
to negotiate the terms of a new contract that would take effect upon termina-
tion of the existing one on June 1, 1965. The negotiators did not submit their
proposals to the parties until June; the union accepted the proposed settle-
ment, but the city rejected it. Further discussion proved fruitless, and on
June 22 the union requested a panel as provided by the statute. Accordingly,
the appointees of each party met and agreed on a third person. On three
occasions, this third person refused the position. With no settlement forth-
coming, the union struck on July 16, a month and a half after the previous
contract had expired. The employer subsequently obtained a temporary
restraining order." A three-member panel was finally formed, and it soon
rendered a majority report in favor of the union's position." The city never-
theless rejected the recommendation, and, when the injunction was later
made permanent, the union was without recourse and compelled to accept
the city's terms.
It is readily apparent that the three-member panel had no effect upon
the outcome of the dispute, and certainly did not provide the union with a
substitute for the right to strike. Of particular importance is the fact that
(12 See pp. 284-85 infra.
63
 N.D. Cent. Code §§ 34-11-01 to -05 (1960).
84 N.D. Cent. Code § 34-11-02 (1960).
65 There is no clause providing for the appointment of the third member in the event
that the two partisan members are unable to agree to the third.
66 If the recommendations are rejected, either party is "entitled to ask the board of
mediators for further consideration." ND. Cent. Code § 34-11-04 (1960).
67 142 N.W.2d 612 (N.D. 1966).
gg There is no statutory prohibition of strikes by public employees in North Dakota.
The court held that it was nevertheless a well-recognized principle that public employees
had no right to strike and that the enactment of § 34-11 was not intended to alter this
principle. Id. at 617.
69 The principal issue in the negotiation dispute was the union's request for a contract
clause allowing voluntary check-off of union dues. Id. at 613. Compare Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 7-477 (Supp. 1965).
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the negotiations in the three months prior to June I were carried on by
persons who were without authority to bind the parties. This case is an
excellent example of how the collective bargaining rights of public employees
may be circumvented by the government employer exercising his prerogative
to reject the product of negotiations. 7°
The steadfast refusal of the city to accept the negotiators' agreement and
the panel's recommendations might very well suggest that the city lacked
good faith. The statute, however, does not impose such an obligation. The
statute is also unsatisfactory because it fails to provide a method insuring
creation of the three-member panel as expediently as possible. 7 ' Indeed, the
statute makes no reference as to the appropriate time for the formation of
the panel. This is in sharp contrast to the Connecticut, Massachusetts, and
Wisconsin statutes, which strongly imply that fact-finding provisions should
be invoked with sufficient time to allow for the submission of recommenda-
tions before the present contract expires. 72
E. Pennsylvania
The scope of the Pennsylvania statute73 is similar to that of North
Dakota, i.e., limited to a procedure for the settlement of disputes. A govern-
ment agency shall, at the request of its employees, set up a three-member
panel consisting of a representative of each party and a third impartial
member chosen by the other two. If the partisan members cannot agree to
the third person, the court appoints him. The government agency must pay
all the expenses of the panel. If within thirty days after creation of the
panel, negotiations have not produced an "adjustment of the grievances,"
the panel may hold hearings and submit findings. The head of the agency
involved shall comply with these recommendations as far as he is able
and, if necessary, present them to the legislative body for implementation.
The imprecise wording of the Pennsylvania statute has caused a certain
amount of confusion as to its scope and application. The meaning of the
term "grievances" has been litigated in this state just as it has been in
Michigan." In private industry, "grievances" is a term ordinarily used to
denote disputes pertaining to an existing contract. 75 The Pennsylvania courts
75 But see Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 7-474(e) (Supp. 1965).
71 See note 65 supra. The Michigan, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania statutes do not
cover the exact situation in this case, i.e., where the third person agreed to by both
parties refuses the position, but the fact that they give the parties only five days to agree
(in Pennsylvania fifteen days) suggests that the failure to form a panel at the end of this
period, regardless of the cause, would mean the third person would be appointed.
12 See pp. 274-75 supra.
72 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 215.1 (1964).
74 DeBlasio v. Capra, 413 Pa. 148, 196 A.2d 352 (1964); Pittsburgh City Fire
Fighters Local 1 v. Barr, 408 Pa. 325, 184 A.2d 588 (1962); Broadwater v. Otto, 370
Pa. 611, 88 A.2d 878 (1952) ; Erie Fire Fighters Local 293 v. Gardner, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d
327 (CT. Erie County 1961), aff'd, 406 Pa. 395, 178 A.2d 691 (1962). Compare Labor
Mediation Bd. v. Jackson County Road Comm'rs, supra note 53. See generally Finkelhor,
Municipal Corporations, 1963-1964 Survey of Pennsylvania Law, 26 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 195
(1965).
75 See Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
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have rejected this narrow definition in interpreting the meaning of the statute,
and have construed "grievances" to embrace all disputes no matter what
their source."
Since the statute states that the chief executive officer of the govern-
ment unit involved "shall take the proper administrative measures . . . to
comply with the findings of the panel,"" the court in Erie Firefighters Local
293 v. Gardner" had to determine whether the three-member panel's finding
was binding or merely advisory. Citing the unconstitutionality of any bind-
ing arbitration," the court concluded that it was the legislature's intent to
make it advisory. The court also pointed out that even if the panel's findings
were binding, the provision would be meaningless, since, under another statu-
tory provision, 8° the chief executive officer of the City of Erie, the Mayor,
was without authority to enter into a contract with the union. 81
In Broadwater v. Otto,82 plaintiff was fired from his job as a guard at
defendant's prison. Consequently, plaintiff's union requested that defendant
set up a three-member panel in compliance with the statute. 83 The issues
sought to be discussed concerned job security and union recognition in refer-
ence to the union's allegation that plaintiff was fired solely because of his
involvement in union affairs. The defendant refused the union's request, and
in plaintiff's suit for a writ of mandamus, the court upheld defendant's posi-
tion, finding that the statute did not apply to an employee dismissal where
a strike was not involved. 84
Although the decision in the Broadwater case may be unnecessarily nar-
row,85
 it is submitted that the real fault lies in the inadequacy of the statute
to provide comprehensive measures which would have avoided the need for
mandamus, or would have aided an amicable settlement without recourse
to the courts. The unfortunate results of the failure to include in the statute
a union recognition procedure, a prohibition of unfair labor practices, and
76 In Pittsburgh City Fire Fighters, supra note 74, the defendant argued that
"grievances" meant only disputes arising out of an existing contract and did not pertain
to wage and hour terms of a new agreement. The court, in rejecting this argument, cited
the Michigan case of Garden City School Dist. v. Labor Mediation Bd., supra note 54.
77
 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 215.1(b) (1964).
78 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 327 (C.P. Erie County 1961), aff'd, 406 Pa. 395, 178 A.2d 691
(1962).
79 Id. at 335.
80
 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, § 35902 (1957).
81
 The authority to prescribe duties and compensation was vested in the five-man
city council of which the Mayor was a member.
82 370 Pa. 611, 88 A.2d 878 (1952).
83
 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 215.1(b) (1964).
84
 370 Pa. at 616, 88 Aid at 881. The court cited an unreported 1950 opinion of the
attorney general which declared: "It is quite clear that the grievance machinery was to
provide for presentation of complaints . . . during employment in order to deter strikes
in accordance with the over-all purpose of the legislation."
85 The rationale of the court was that because the statute was enacted to prevent
strikes, and because a discharged employee obviously cannot strike, there was no
"grievance" within the meaning of the statute. Cf. Op. Att'y Gem No. 270-D (Minn.
1959) (discharge of an employee may be the basis for a "grievance").
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an obligation to meet in good faith, meant that plaintiff's employment security
was at the mercy of his employer.
II. ANALYSIS
The statutes of Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania
were initially enacted as strike prevention measures," and, as such, con-
tributed little to the collective bargaining process. Recent amendments have
substantially altered the significance and approach of the Minnesota and
Michigan statutes. Several shortcomings remain, notably in the fact-finding
procedures and, in Minnesota, in specifically permitting higher administra-
tive review of an agreement.
On the other hand, the statutes of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Wis-
consin were initially enacted with the objective of providing meaningful
labor-management relations in public employment. 87 They present a more
coherent and orderly system for collective bargaining. All three, in addition
to mediation and fact-finding, provide for: (I) the recognition of an employee
union as exclusive bargaining agent for the members of an appropriate bar-
gaining unit; (2) jurisdiction in a state agency to determine recognition
questions, including elections if necessary; (3) placement of responsibility
for negotiations upon the head of the employer agency; (4) the legal obli-
gation on both parties to bargain in good faith; and (5) the prohibition of
certain unfair labor practices, and procedures for enforcement of the prohi-
bitions. A further examination of the principal problems observed in the
public employment area will substantiate the contention that these three
statutes are to be considered an exemplary step forward.
Perhaps the single most important factor in any labor-management re-
lationship is the existence or absence of an atmosphere which tends to promote
good-faith intentions.88 Management personnel among public employers often
harbor prejudices against unions and union activity. There is a widespread
reluctance by such persons to recognize the value of amicable relations with
employees or to appreciate the possible advantages of management-union
cooperation." In order to encourage an atmosphere conducive to constructive
88 E.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 215.1 (1964) is entitled "Strikes by Public Em-
ployees."
87 See, e.g., Report of the Interim Commission To Study Collective Bargaining by
Municipalities (Conn. 1965), where it is recommended that
the General Assembly should adopt comprehensive legislation to set the standards
for collective bargaining in municipal jurisdictions. There is no longer any real
question about the benefits which derive from according public employees a
meaningful voice in determining the conditions under which they work.
Id. at 8. The statute proposed by this commission was adopted without material change.
88 As one commentator has succinctly stated, "employers get exactly the kind of
employee relations they deserve." Fay, Before Collective Bargaining Begins, in Develop-
ments in Public Employee Relations 41 (Warner ed. 1965).
89 rd. at 41-44; Terry, Collective Bargaining in the U.S. Department of the Interior,
Symposium, 22 Pub. Admin. Rev. 19 (1962) ; Thompson, Collective Bargaining in the
Public Service—The TVA Experience and Its Implications for Other Government Agencies,
17 Lab. L.J. 89 (1966) ; Zander, A Union View of Collective Bargaining in the Public
Service, Symposium, 22 Pub. Admin. Rev. 5 (1962).
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relations, the Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin statutes, and the
amended Michigan statute, impose an unambiguous obligation on parties
to meet and bargain in good faith. Supplementing this imposition are the
procedures for union recognition and the inclusion of an unfair labor prac-
tice standard. The Minnesota statute evidences recognition of the importance
of this obligation, but does not clearly manifest an intent to impose it upon
employers and employee representatives.
The Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin statutes clearly dis-
tinguish between the negotiation impasse situation and grievances arising
out of an existing contract. As observed previously, fact-finding with recom-
mendations by a three-member panel consisting of two partisan and one non-
partisan member has been applied in other states to both those circum-
stances." The distinction is, however, an important one and reflects the
greater sophistication of the Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin stat-
utes, which provide that fact-finding with recommendations by a totally
impartial fact-finder" should be applied only to the negotiation impasse
situation. The importance of the distinction lies in the fact that grievance
disputes usually pertain to a single employee, or a complaint against certain
practices of supervisory officials," Settlement of these disputes requires an
interpretation or application of, or a supplement to, existing employment
provisions." Grievances are not likely to involve complex issues, and are
conducive to a settlement, the scope of which can be confined to the particular
facts of the grievance. On the other hand, fact-finding, in the event of a
negotiation deadlock over the terms of a new contract, often requires an
exhaustive study of budgetary and statutory limitations, comparative wage
and hour structures, cost-of-living indices, and all the other factors pertinent
to an agreement."
As a result of its give-and-take debate, a three-member panel where
two are partisan and one nonpartisan may well be suited to resolving griev-
ance disputes. The study called for in the negotiation impasse situation,
however, requires objectivity rather than debate, and thus a totally impartial
fact-finder is definitely preferable for resolving this type of dispute. The
fact-finder's impartiality takes on additional significance in view of his po-
tential role as a mediator." The Wisconsin experience is especially revealing,
99 See text accompanying notes 43 (Minnesota), 55 (Michigan), 74 & 76 (Pennsyl-
vania) supra.
91 In the three states referred to, the "totally impartial fact-finder" is one person,
except in those instances in Wisconsin where both parties request a three-member panel.
92 See generally Massey, Employee Grievance Procedures, in Developments in Public
Employee Relations 64 (Warner ed. 1965) ; Harper, Labor Relations in the Postal Service,
17 Ind. & Lab. ReI. Rev. 443 (1964).
93 The usual type of grievance procedure is an appeal process starting from the
immediate supervisory official and culminating in a final decision by the highest official.
Arbitration, whether complementing the appeal system or not, is not infrequent and most
often is binding.
94 Only Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179.57 subd. 4 (1966) suggests criteria to be used in the
panel's findings and recommendations.
03
 See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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because the fact-finding procedures have been in effect since 1962." As of
October 1, 1966, unofficial statistics show that there have been 113 petitions
for fact-finding, only 41 of which have resulted in the issuance of recom-
mendations." The remainder of the petitions were withdrawn because the
parties had reached a settlement, either through mediation by the fact-finder
or through further negotiations or, more likely, through a combination of
both." The Connecticut statistics, based on a much shorter period of time,
show similar trends." It is evident that the importance of fact-finding is not
simply in producing a recommended solution, but is also in bringing the
parties together for further discussion and hopefully a settlement before a
recommendation is made. An impartial fact-finder is more suitable for this
purpose than the three-member panel used in Michigan, Minnesota, North
Dakota, and Pennsylvania.
It is important that fact-finding not be an automatic procedure, resorted
to at the slightest indication of conflict between employer and employees.
A blue ribbon committee, created in New York after the 1966 transit workers
strike, reported that
impasse procedures often tend to be overused; they may become too
accessible, and as a consequence, the responsibility and problem-
solving virtues of constructive negotiations are lost. Dispute settle-
ment procedures can become habit-forming, and then negotiations
become only a ritual.'90
This tendency has been witnessed in Wisconsin"' and presumably exists
in the other states. The statutes of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan,
and Wisconsin have attempted to offset the tendency by implying that fact-
finding is to be made available as a matter of discretion on the part of
the state labor board, and not as a matter of right.'" This implication is to
99 There has been extensive analysis of the Wisconsin fact-finding procedure. See,
e.g., Stern, The Wisconsin Public Employee Fact-Finding Procedure, 20 Ind. & Lab. Rel.
Rev. 3, 7-8 (1966) ; Note, Municipal Employment in Wisconsin, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 652;
Note, Municipal Employment Relations in Wisconsin: The Extension of Private Labor
Relations Devices Into Municipal Employment, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 671.
97 Letter from Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, Oct. 7, 1966. The writer
emphasizes that these statistics are approximations and are not to be regarded as official
board figures.
98 Ibid.
99 The Connecticut statute became effective on June 4, 1965. As of Oct. 10, 1966,
nine petitions for fact-finding had been received by the Connecticut Board of Mediation
& Arbitration. Three petitions were withdrawn during the board's investigation to
determine if fact-finding was warranted. Of the remaining six cases, the fact-finder was
able to resolve two disputes through his mediation efforts. Thus, of the nine cases, five
were settled without the need for a final fact-finding report. Letter from Connecticut
Board of Mediation & Arbitration, Oct. 10, 1966. There are no meaningful statistics based
on the Massachusetts experience because the fact-finding procedures did not go into effect
until 1966.
100 Final Report, Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations 45-46 (N.Y.
1966).
101 Note, Municipal Employment in Wisconsin, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 652, 665.
102 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-473(b) (Supp. 1965) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149,
§ 178J(b) (Supp. 1965); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17454(27) (1960); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70-
285
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
be contrasted with the statutes of the other three states examined, which
indicate that all that is required to set up a fact-finding panel is the request
of a majority of employees.'"
Two other factors in relation to the use of fact-finding should be men-
tioned. The first is the cost provisions of the seven states examined. All except
North Dakota and Pennsylvania provide that the costs of fact-finding are
to be shared equally by the employer and the employees.104 In those two
states, the costs are paid wholly by the employer. 105 Although obviously of
limited effect, the shared-costs provisions tend to minimize the number of
fact-findings and to discourage frivolous requests for them. 100
 The second
factor is the force of public opinion. Because management officials are
answerable to an electorate, either directly or through a higher, elected offi-
cial, public opinion is important in public employment labor relations.'"
The publication of a fact-finding with recommendations furnishes a standard
by which the public may judge the merits of the contentions of each party
to the dispute, and thereafter assert a well-informed opinion. It has been
pointed out that
fact-finding is not so much a case of finding facts of which the
parties are ignorant, but rather of sharpening the consequences of
the facts already known. From the viewpoint of both parties then,
the position of public opinion is one of the major consequences to
be evaluated.'"
This same commentator analogizes the union's economic power as a factor
in private collective bargaining to the pressure of public opinion as a factor
influencing the government employer.'"
As already seen in the General Drivers110 and Erie" cases, the presence
of an administrative hierarchy and the division of authority between executive
(4) (f) (Supp. 1966). In practice, a petition is rarely rejected. In the preliminary investi-
gation before a fact-finder is selected, however, the mediation efforts of the investigator
have often resulted in a settlement, a fact which suggests that the alleged dispute was not
serious enough to constitute a true negotiation deadlock. Letter (Wisconsin), supra note
97; Letter (Connecticut), supra note 99.
103 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179.57 subd. 1 (1966); N.D. Cent. Code § 34-11-02 (1960);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 215.1(b) (1964).
1 " Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-473(e) (Supp. 1965) (full costs to party guilty of bad
faith); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, § 178J (e) (Supp. 1965) (full costs to party guilty
of bad faith); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.454(27) (d) (1960); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179.57 subd.
3 (1966); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70(4) (h)2 (Supp. 1966). Cf. Krinsky, Public Employment
Fact-Finding in Fourteen States, 17 Lab. L.J. 532, 540 (1966).
1°5 N.D. Cent. Code § 34-11-05 (1960); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 215.1(b) (1964).
100 Connecticut Interim Comm. Report, supra note 87, at 16; Stern, supra note
96, at 8.
1°7 See New York Final Report, supra note 100, at 53; Belasco, Resolving Dispute
over Contract Terms in the State Public Service: An Analysis, 16 Lab. L.J. 533, 542
(1965); Thompson, supra note 89, at 92; Note, The Strike and Its Alternative in Public
Employment, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 549, 560-62.
108 Belasco, supra note 107, at 542.
100 Ibid.
110 142 N.W.2d 612 (ND. 1966).
111 Supra note 78.
286
CURRENT LEGISLATION
management and legislative fiscal control may negate the product of col-
lective bargaining agreements. A simple statement of the problem is impos-
sible because of the great variation in the degree of government authority.
For instance, state executive department employees are in a different posi-
tion from those of semi-autonomous state agencies. Statutes or charters
delegating fiscal authority to municipal corporations provide several varia-
tions. One factor common to most government departments is that final au-
thority for basic work conditions such as wages and hours is vested in a
legislative or budget-making body." 2 Courts have consistently refused to
allow any abrogation of this final authority, and conseqently have not per-
mitted executive officers, governing boards, or commissions to bind the gov-
ernment unit to compensation terms in a bilateral contract."° There has
also been controversy as to the power of a municipality to contract with a
group of employees as to any terms of employment. The landmark case of
Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ.," 4 however, has established a
trend upholding bilateral contracts between a government employer and its
employees."°
With or without the necessity for final legislative appropriation to
fulfill the compensation terms, it is essential to bilateral bargaining that there
be no administrative review of a settlement reached by negotiations. Only
Connecticut"° and Massachusetts 117 have included provisions which place
responsibility for negotiations upon the chief executive officer of the govern-
ment unit involved. These provisions preclude higher review by other than a
legislative body. The Connecticut Interim Commission reported:
A key provision in this legislation is the fixing of the responsibility
for representing the municipality in bargaining in the chief executive
officer of the municipality. This is an administrative function, not
legislative . . . and we are providing that he should sign any agree-
ment as a ministerial act.il°
The Connecticut statute goes one step further. It requires the budget-making
112 See generally Male, Labor Crises and the Role of Management, in Developments
in Public Employee Relations 103, 106 (Warner ed. 1965).
113 Sec 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 12.35, .38 (rev. ed. 1963) ; 4
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 12.176, .177, .179 (1949 ed.). The theoretical
principle behind this rationale is stated in the leading case of City of Springfield v. Clouse,
356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947):
It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that the legislature cannot dele-
gate its legislative powers and any delegation thereof is void . . . If such
powers cannot be delegated, they surely cannot be bargained or contracted
away ; and certainly not by any administrative or executive officers who cannot
have any legislative powers.
Id. at 1251, 206 S.W.2d at 545.
114 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
115 See Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.455(15) (Supp. 1965). See generally Cornell, Collective
Bargaining by Public Employee Groups, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 43 (1958) ; Strayhorn,
Municipal Employees and the Law, 1961 U. Ill. L.F. 377, 383-87.
118 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-474(a) (Supp. 1965).
117 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, § 1781 (Supp. 1965).
118 Connecticut Interim Comm. Report, supra note 87, at 16-17.
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authority to implement the terms of any agreement by the necessary appro-
priation, "notwithstanding any provision of any general statute, charter,
special act or ordinance to the contrary.""° Consequently, the employer
negotiator who previously was subject to budget limitations has direct
authority to bind the municipality to an agreement reached with an em-
ployee representative.' 2° The impact of this provision is to provide mean-
ingful bilateral bargaining without the specter of review by a higher authority.
III. EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 10988
The federal executive branch has taken a somewhat unique approach
to the establishment of a systematic collective bargaining process. This
approach is embodied in the procedures outlined in Executive Order No.
10988121
 issued by President Kennedy in 1962. The provisions of that Order,
and the problems encountered since its proclamation, shed light on similar
provisions and problems in the state statutes.
Under the Order, employee groups are accorded informal, formal, or
exclusive recognition. Any group not qualified for the other two classifica-
tions is entitled to informal recognition and, accordingly, is granted the
right to present its views at reasonable times. 122
 Formal recognition is given
when no organization is entitled to receive exclusive recognition, and the
petitioning organization's membership contains at least ten per cent of the
employees in the bargaining unit. A formally recognized group may not only
present its views, but is also entitled to consult with its employer concerning
work conditions and personnel practices. 122 Exclusive recognition is accorded
an organization which consists of a majority of employees within a bargain-
ing unit. Such an organization must represent all employees and negotiate
agreements for them. The employer must meet at reasonable times with the
exclusively recognized union. 124
 Any agreement reached is put in the form
of a written memorandum, and must be approved by the agency head. An
agreement is subject to any existing laws controlling its terms. 125 Such an
115 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-474(c) (Supp. 1965).
125 In Risi v. City of Norwalk, 144 Conn. 525, 134 A.2d 514 (1957), the police board
was obligated to fix the salaries of policemen. The board reached an agreement with the
policemen which included a salary schedule calling for gradual wage increases. The board
included this schedule in their estimate of expenses to the board of estimation and
taxation, which was the budget authority. The latter board refused to appropriate funds
necessary to meet the increases specified in the salary schedule. The court held that while
the board of estimation and taxation cannot refuse to grant an appropriation, it does
have discretionary power to reject what it considers to be extravagant requests. Had
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-474(c) (Supp. 1965) been in effect, however, the appropriation
would have been mandatory upon the budget authority.
121 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962), [hereinafter cited as Exec. Order No. 10988]. Supple-
menting the Order is the Presidential Memorandum of May 21, 1963, which established
an unfair labor practices code governing employees covered by the Order. Standards of
Conduct for Employee Organizations and Code of Fair Labor Practices, 28 Fed. Reg. 5127
(1963).
122 Exec. Order No. 10988, § 4.
123 Exec. Order No. 10988, § 5.
124 Exec. Order No. 10988, § 6.
125 Exec. Order No. 10988, § 7.
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agreement may include provisions for a grievance procedure, including ad-
visory arbitration. The advisory arbitration, however, shall not extend to
any alteration of an agreement.'" The Secretary of Labor shall provide an
arbitrator, through the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, who
will decide questions of bargaining unit appropriateness and hold an election
if necessary.' 27 Another provision states that the Civil Service Commission
should maintain a program to further the objectives of the Order.' 28
There is a noticeable lack of any negotiation impasse procedure. The
principal reasons advanced by the President's Task Force, whose report was
the basis of the Executive Order, were (1) "that the availability of arbitra-
tion would have an escalation effect whereby the parties, instead of working
out their differences by hard, serious negotiation, would continually take
their problems to a third party for settlement . . . ,"" 29 and (2) that the lack
of experience in negotiating on the part of government officials and employees
would make advisory arbitration inappropriate.'"
Limitations on the power of the federal executive branch may further
explain why the Task Force omitted an impasse procedure. Negotiations are
necessarily restricted in scope because of congressional authority to prescribe
pay, hours of work, and fringe benefits for most personnel."' These items are
thus excluded from federal negotiations, although in state and municipal
government they are invariably the focal point of discussion despite the
fact that final fiscal appropriation may be necessary. This exclusion un-
doubtedly lessens the probability of a serious dispute.'" A fact substantiating
the conclusion that an impasse procedure is not needed is that a strike by
federal employees has not been reported since World War 11. 183
The Task Force Report noted that up to 1962 certain government
officials had construed the absence of collective bargaining procedures "as
an excuse for hostile and obstructionist attitudes,"" 34 and that where heads
of government agencies have attempted to effectuate cooperative relations,
the vertical chain of command has proven a barrier to the implementation
of this goal.'" Reports on the effectiveness of Executive Order No. 10988
indicate that these problems still persist.'" Management reaction to the
126 Exec. Order No. 10988, § 8.
127 Exec. Order No. 10988, § 11.
128 Exec. Order No. 10988, § 12.
123 President's Task Force on Employee-Management Relations in the Federal
Service, A Policy for Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service 19
(1961). Compare pp. 285-86 supra.
130 Ibid.
131 For those subjects which have been negotiated, see U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Bull. No. 1451, Collective Bargaining Agreements in the
Federal Service, Late Summer 1964 (1965).
132 The Task Force reported that "major employee organizations . . . are aware of
these limitations and are quite content to negotiate within them." Supra note 129, at 18.
133 Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the United States Federal Civil Service 200 n.70
(1966).
134 Task Force Report, supra note 129, at 6.
135 Ibid.
136 See generally Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the United States Federal Civil
Service (1966); Report of the Committee on Law of Government Employee Relations,
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Order has not always been receptive. An additional problem has been that
many government negotiators are ignorant of restrictive laws or regulations,
and agreements consequently have to be rejected by the agency head. 137
Sometimes the agency head has rejected an agreement simply because he did
not like its terms. 138
As a result of these problems, the greatest criticism of the Order has
concerned the lack of a central authority."° The Civil Service Commission
has taken steps to improve this situation by offering advice and assistance.
For example, the Commission's Office of Career Development has conducted
three-day workshops intended to familiarize management officials with nego-
tiation techniques and to provide them with the proper background so that
they can enter into meaningful negotiations. 14° The Commission has never-
theless been accused of undermining the objectives of the Order by endorsing
the policies of those agency officials who are reluctant to enter into mean-
ingful negotiations with employee unions.' 41
Since the collective bargaining procedures of the Order were established
by the executive branch itself, it is not unreasonable to expect that the dif-
fusion of authority problem and the reluctance of some officials to accede
to the spirit of the Order can be overcome by time and the efforts of high-level
officials to fully implement the goals of the Order. One very salutary effect
has already been observed in the application of the Order: the provisions en-
titling an employee group to at least informal recognition have resulted in
many instances in a significant increase in communication between employer
and employees. 142
 Such occurrences are the foundation for a solid relation-
ship leading to effective collective bargaining negotiations.
Due to the circumstances surrounding Executive Order No. 10988—the
clearly defined limitations on the subject matter of negotiations, the history
of no strikes, the structure of the executive department—its provisions or
lack thereof do not have a great deal of pertinence to the state and munic-
ipal situation. 142
 States and municipalities, however, would do well to ex-
amine the administrative difficulties discussed above, which are typical of
ABA, 1965 Proceedings of the Section of Labor Relations Law 321; Report of the Com-
mittee on Law of Government Employee Relations, ABA, 1964 Proceedings of the Section
of Labor Relations Law 355; Hart, The Impasse in Labor Relations in the Federal Civil
Service, 19 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 175 (1966); Hart, The U.S. Civil Service Learns to
Live with Executive Order 10988: An Interim Appraisal, 17 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 203
(1964).
137 Vosloo, op. cit. supra note 136, at 109.
138 ABA Report (1964), supra note 136, at 361.
130 See Vosloo, op. cit. supra note 136, at 68-91; ABA Report (1965), supra note
136, at 329.
140 ABA Report (1964), supra note 136, at 360.
141 Hart, The Impasse in Labor Relations in the Federal Civil Service, supra note 136.
142 Vosloo, op. cit. supra note 136, at 137.
143
 See Bargaining Rights of Public Employees, 63 L.R.R. 40 (Sept. 12, 1966), in
which it was reported that members of the joint convention of labor mediation agencies
and the National Association of State Labor Relations Agencies agreed that the approach
of Executive Order No. 10988 should not be applied to the states because it stresses the
differences between public and private employment.
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the problems encountered when systematic collective bargaining procedures
are instituted in public employer-employee relations.
IV. OTHER APPROACHES
Two approaches other than the ones witnessed in the federal govern-
ment and in the states have been advocated. The first is the use of compul-
sory arbitration, and the second is a revision of the denial of the right to
strike.
Compulsory arbitration is a controversial subject. One proponent of this
procedure notes that "this proposed solution is itself engulfed in a tangle of
legal, historical and emotional problems—so much so that its implementa-
tion would be extremely difficult: 444 Compulsory arbitration provisions have
been held to be an unwarranted delegation of governmental authority,'"
and thus raise serious problems of validity under state constitutions. Instances
of compulsory arbitration provisions in public employment do exist, however,
either by virtue of statutory authority'" or by a contract provision between
an employer and an employee union. 147 The tendency, noted earlier, of
weakening negotiating efforts by providing impasse procedures is quite ob-
viously intensified when compulsory arbitration prevails. As one commentator
put it, compulsory arbitration fails "because public management and public
employees both sit back and do nothing about honest-to-goodness negotia-
tions."148 Because of this tendency, the constitutionality issue, and the con-
troversial nature of the procedure, compulsory arbitration is at this time an
unacceptable solution to the problems inherent in the public employment area.
Those who advocate revising the prohibition of the right to strike for,
public employees concede that certain types of employees should never be
allowed to strike.'" A distinction has been suggested between "governmental"
and "proprietary" functions,"° comparable to that found in the governmental
tort immunity doctrine."' A more logical distinction is between services
essential to the public welfare, such as policemen and firemen, and those
services which, if suspended by strike, would not inflict an intolerable hard-
ship upon the public. This distinction has never been recognized by any
legislative or executive body, and would entail a statutory enactment of
144 Shenton, Compulsory Arbitration in the Public Service, 17 Lab. L.J. 138 (1966).
145 The leading case is Mugford v. Mayor of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745
(1945).
149 E.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179.38 (1966) (employees of public hospitals).
147 E.g., Agreement, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority and Division 589
of the Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of
America (1958, as amended, Feb. 1966).
148 Male, op. cit. supra note 112, at 108.
149 E.g., Collective Bargaining Policy Statement, American Fed'n of State, Municipal,
and County Employees, AFL-CIO, cited in Kay, State, County, and Municipal Employees:
Biennial Convention, 89 Monthly Lab. Rev. 736, 738 (1966).
150 Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River Project, 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954).
Compare Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,
54 Cal. 2d 684, 355 P.2d 905, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1960).
151 But see Delaware River & Bay Authority v. Organization of Masters, Mates,
and Pilots, 45 N.J. 138, 146, 211 A.2d 789, 793 (1965) ; City of Alcoa v. Local 760,
IBEW, 203 Tenn. 12, 23-25, 308 S.W.2d 476, 481-82 (1957).
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considerable elaboration in order to establish a workable standard: As the
New York Governor's Committee concluded:
To begin with, a differentiation between essential and nonessential
governmental services would be the subject of such intense and
never-ending controversy as to be administratively impossible.
There is, however, an even more telling reason. Careful thought
about the matter shows conclusively, we believe, that while the right
to strike normally performs a useful function in the private enter-
prise sector (where relative economic power is the final determinant .
in the making of private agreements), it is not compatible with the
orderly functioning of our democratic form of representative gov-
ernment (in which relative political power is the final determi-
nant) . 152
In conclusion, only seven states and the federal government have
established collective bargaining procedures covering most or all of their public
employees. The relative merits of these procedures involve complex issues and
a variety of problems. It is apparent that a provision for advisory arbitra-
tion in the form of fact-finding with recommendations is, by itself, not enough.
A more comprehensive approach is needed to deal with the many problems
encountered. Only a positive attitude, not limited solely to the negative
purpose of preventing strikes by offering arbitration, will enable a state legis-
lature to achieve this end. It is to be hoped that the progressive examples
established by Wisconsin and Executive Order No. 10988, and improved
upon by Connecticut and Massachusetts, will continue. Only through improve-
ment of the collective bargaining process for public employees will the likeli-
hood of mutual hostility and of serious disputes be minimized, and a mean-
ingful alternative to the right to strike established.
SAMUEL P. SEARS, JR.
152 Final Report, Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations 19 (N.Y.
1966).
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